Corporate Governance and Responsible Investment Policy

North America 2020
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This Policy document sets out Legal & General Investment Management’s (LGIM) expectations of investee companies in the North American market in terms of environmental, social and governance issues. This is a region specific document and is therefore separate to our Global Principles document which provides a full explanation of LGIM’s approach and expectations in respect of key topics we believe are essential for an efficient governance framework.

LGIM publicly discloses its voting decisions on a monthly basis, including the rationale for votes against management. These reports are accessible on the corporate governance section of the LGIM website.

Investor Stewardship Group Framework

LGIM endorses the newly launched framework for US stewardship and governance by the Investor Stewardship Group, supporting the need for investor led best practice guidelines for both companies and investors in the US market. The Principles for US Listed Companies includes six principles that are fundamental to good governance at listed companies and reflect many of the beliefs set out in our policies. However, LGIM’s principles may be more specific and, on certain issues, more robust. LGIM sits on the ISG Governance Committee, which oversees the continual development of the Principles.
Company board

The board of directors is responsible for the management and long-term success of the company, taking into account the best interests of the company and its stakeholders. It should act as a steward of stakeholders’ interests which is the role that is delegated to them by stakeholders.

The board has the most important task of setting the strategy and direction of the business, ensuring that the necessary resources are available to enable its implementation and that appropriate risk management and internal controls are in place. It sets the philosophy for the company, ensuring that stakeholder views are considered and embedded in its culture. The board is expected to take into account environmental, social and governance considerations and to report on company performance in these areas. It is also responsible for ensuring the integrity of the company’s accounting and reporting, and the effectiveness of internal control systems. Lastly, the board is ultimately accountable to investors and other stakeholders and should make sure board decisions are effectively communicated to them.
**Board leadership**

LGIM believes that having the right composition at the top of a company is an essential element of its success. We expect each director on the board to fully exercise their duties and promote the long-term success of the company.

**The Board Chair and the Chief Executive Officer**

The responsibilities of the Chair include leading the board, setting the agenda for board meetings and ensuring directors receive accurate and timely meeting information. Under his or her direction, there should be a good flow of information within the board and the board committees. The Chair is also responsible for leading the appointment process of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO).

The Chair should be able to challenge the executive directors and encourage the non-executive directors to actively participate in board discussions. It is the Chair’s role to regularly assess whether the board members have the adequate skills and diversity to make a positive contribution.

By contrast, the CEO has the responsibility of executing the strategy agreed by the board and of leading the business.

Given the importance of the role, **LGIM expects the Chair to be independent at the time of appointment.**

LGIM would therefore **not expect a retiring CEO to take on the role of Chair.** As these two roles involve different responsibilities and a different approach to board relations and the company, we have concerns that a hands-on CEO may find it difficult to become a hands-off Chair. Where a company would find the presence of the former CEO on the board beneficial in times of transition, we encourage the company to allow the CEO to be consulted by the board but not be a formal board member and would stipulate for this to be for a maximum period of one year.

There are also some instances where a company may, for a short period, be governed by an executive Chair. This tends to be when the company is undergoing a shift in its structure or management, or is under severe stress. In such circumstances, **LGIM would expect companies to commit to re-split the roles within a short pre-set timetable.** In addition, we expect that a **deputy chair also be appointed** to ensure that no person has unfettered powers of decision.


**The case of the combined Chair and CEO**

The roles of Chair and CEO are substantially different, requiring distinctly different skills and experience. Therefore, **LGIM expects the two roles to be separated.** However, this division of responsibilities ensures that a single individual does not have unfettered powers of decision at the head of the company, thereby securing a proper balance of authority and responsibility on the board.

**As of January 2020, LGIM will be voting against the re-election of any director that is a combined Chair/CEO.**

In addition we expect the Company to maintain a strong lead independent director.

Where a company currently separates the roles of Chair and CEO, **LGIM strongly discourages the company to re-combine the two roles.** This decision should also be put to a shareholder vote for approval given that these are key board risk functions.


**Senior or Lead Independent Director**

The Senior or Lead Independent Director plays an essential role on the board and should lead the succession process of the Chair and appraise the Chair’s performance. Additionally, they should **meet investors** regularly in order to stay well informed of key concerns.

They can also be a key contact for investors, especially when the normal channels of the Chair, CEO, or Chief Financial Officer have failed to address concerns or are not the appropriate avenues.

LGIM expects the Senior or Lead Independent Director to be a fully independent non-executive director. This is of extra importance when the company has a combined Chair and CEO.


**Non-executive directors**

LGIM expects non-executive directors to use their skills and experience to constructively contribute to board discussions and help develop proposals on strategy. They are expected to oversee management performance and challenge the executive directors.
Given the responsibility the role involves, non-executive directors must make sure they have sufficient time to perform their duties. LGIM expects non-executive directors to take this into account when they take on outside board roles.

**Structure and operation**

**Diversity**

LGIM believes a suitably diverse mix of skills, experience and perspectives is essential for a board to function and perform optimally. Several studies have demonstrated that a good level of diversity has the ability to improve business decision making, minimise business risk, improve the sustainability of profits growth and therefore maximise long-term returns for investors.

Therefore, when recruiting members, a board should be cognisant of all elements of diversity that appropriately represent the company’s operations, including gender, age, nationality, ethnic origin, background and experience. Consideration should also be given to the geographies in which the business operates, its future strategic international expansion plans and its consumer base.

LGIM expects all companies to have at least one female on their board. We also expect companies to seek to promote diversity below board level, at executive committee, senior management and workforce level. We continue to evolve our policy on this important topic. Therefore, from 2020, LGIM will vote against the largest 100 companies in the S&P500 and the S&P/TSX where there is less than 25% women on the board. We are targeting the largest companies as we believe that these should demonstrate leadership on this critical issue. We shall strengthen this policy from 2021 to include all companies in the S&P500 and the S&P/TSX.

Our ultimate expectation is for all companies in this market to reach a minimum of 30% of women on the board and at senior management level by 2023.

To provide investors with a comprehensive understanding of their diversity strategy, we expect companies to be transparent regarding the procedures used to find new members for the board and at senior management level, and how that process ensures a diverse board and senior executive pipeline. We expect all companies to disclose a breakdown of board directors, executive directors, managers and employees by geography, main skill set, and gender.

We expect companies to take targeted action to increase the levels of diversity at board and executive committee levels in order to reach the minimum 30% target by 2023. This action could be supported by establishing an aspirational target to ensure that progress continues.

As the diversity conversation broadens beyond gender, we would expect companies to collect and report their data on ethnicity at board and senior management levels. Whilst we do not stipulate a target on ethnicity we would expect the company to think about this, and other elements of diversity when identifying the right people for a specific role.

Companies should ensure that candidates with appropriate skills and qualities are sought through the widest possible means such as the use of recruitment consultants, public advertisements, and the leverage of other relationships in the industry. Companies should also be prepared to look outside of the usual pool of candidates to include those from a less traditional “corporate board” background. They should also be willing to recruit those without previous board experience as many, if not all, of the board members will have this experience and this will help to expand the candidate pool and the board’s cognitive diversity.

LGIM also asks companies to disclose diversity data at board, executive committee and senior management levels, and also for the rest of the workforce as well as their policy on diversity. A diversity policy should include meaningful information demonstrating how the company is working on its challenges. This will allow investors to be able to assess the extent to which diversity is embedded in the company’s strategy and its efforts and progress towards better diversity levels.

For more details on LGIM’s position, please refer to our publications on the topic available at: http://www.lgim.com/uk/en/capabilities/corporate-governance/influencing-the-debate/

**Independence**

An independent board is essential to ensure the board exercises efficient oversight and consistently acts in the best interests of the company and its stakeholders. Its importance on the performance of a company has been shown is several academic studies. Therefore, as a minimum standard, LGIM expects the board of directors of all companies to comprise at least 50% independent directors.

LGIM would consider a director to be non-independent if he or she:

- Has been an employee of the company or group within the last five years
- Has, or has had within the last three years, a material business relationship with the company either directly, or as a partner, shareholder, director, or senior employee of a body that has such a relationship with the company
- Has received or receives additional remuneration from the company, apart from a director’s fee, such as the company’s share option, performance related pay, or pension scheme
• Has close family ties with any of the company’s advisers, directors, or senior employees

• Holds cross-directorships or has significant links with other directors through involvement in other companies or bodies

• Has served on the board for more than 12 years from the date of first election

• Represents a significant shareholder

LGIM also recognises that non-independent, non-executive directors can offer significant skills and sector knowledge. This can help a company to perform at its best and to maximise value as long as the board remains balanced. In this instance, LGIM expects the company to fully explain how the non-independent director provides valuable input into the business.

Succession Planning
Succession planning is a vital component of an efficient board. It ensures board continuity, and that individuals with the right sets of skills sit on the board.

LGIM expects companies to put in place a formal and transparent procedure for the appointment of new directors. The external board evaluation exercise should assist in this task. We encourage companies to disclose this information in its annual disclosures. This includes what skills the company is looking for and why the selected individual is the right fit for the board.

Re-election of directors
To ensure the successful composition and functioning of the board, it is essential that shareholders have the ability to effectively exercise their voting rights by holding directors accountable. LGIM is opposed to the practice of bundled proposals which prevent shareholders from approving individual nominees to the board.

In addition, we acknowledge that the regulations that govern the frequency for director re-election vary greatly from one country to another. However, LGIM encourages companies to allow shareholders to vote on directors’ elections annually.

In order to allow investors to be able to assess the profile of the board directors proposed to election or re-election and to make sufficiently informed voting decisions, we expect companies to disclose the name of the directors proposed for election or re-election and a detailed biography. We would also encourage the disclosure of attributes and skills which the director brings to the board and how these fit with the long-term strategic direction of the business.

Board effectiveness

Board tenure
The regular refreshment of the board contributes to ensure that its members remain independent from management and third parties, that different perspectives feed into board discussions, and that skillsets remain relevant. A regularly refreshed board is more likely to be willing to question established practices, avoid “group think”, and therefore exercise more efficient oversight over management and stay ahead of market changes.

Board tenure is assessed in two different ways:

• On an individual director basis: we consider optimum tenure for a director to be between 3 and 12 years

• On an average board tenure basis: average tenure across all board members should be between 4 years and 9 years and should not exceed 15 years.

The discussion around board tenure has become a key focus in this market, as it directly impacts diversity and skillsets: considerations that have historically been much weaker in this region. Whilst the majority of board members in this market do not have tenure limits, many companies do apply retirement ages for their directors.

However, LGIM does not consider retirement ages to be an adequate limitation on board tenure as these can be, and often are, easily extended. Instead, LGIM supports an explicit limitation of board tenure, whether this comes through a formal policy or through a more informal approach. Either way, we believe external board evaluations are an important exercise in order to appropriately assess tenure.

LGIM expects the board to be refreshed regularly and we would be concerned if there have been no new directors appointed to the board in the past five years. We would not expect the tenure in the roles of the lead independent director or chair of key committees to exceed 15 years as this impacts their impartiality and independence.

We have published a thought piece on board refreshment that gives more detail and is available on our website.

Board mandates
LGIM believes it is important for executive directors to seek outside board appointments as this will help broaden their skills and knowledge, enabling them to provide more input on board discussions. However, when taking up outside appointments, they should be mindful of the time commitment required to exercise their duties on multiple boards.
LGIM’s limit on the number of board mandates it believes is appropriate is slightly stricter in this market, as we have general concerns around the tenure of directors, and overboarding directly impacts this issue. Therefore, LGIM expects that a full-time CEO at a large public company should not undertake more than one other non-executive directorship at an unrelated listed company. This is especially important in this market as many company chair and CEO roles remain combined. For non-executive directors, LGIM would expect individuals to hold no more than four public company board roles. LGIM considers an independent board chair role to count as two roles due to the extra complexity, oversight and time commitment that it involves. When taking up outside appointments, they should be mindful of the time commitment required to exercise their duties on multiple boards.

In order to help investors assess how directors with other board mandates are performing their duties, we would like to see disclosure of the time commitment required from directors to enable them to fulfill their duties, and how their other mandates do not prevent them from effectively exercising their duties.

**Skillsets**

LGIM expects the company to disclose separate information on the skillsets of board members within the proxy statement, and/or annual disclosures, enabling shareholders to easily understand the composition of the board in terms of skills. This could be provided via a matrix or another illustrative graphic. Some narrative explaining why the specific skillsets identified are important for the company and aligned with its longterm strategy should also be provided.

**Board meetings and attendance**

Regular board meetings are vital for the board to effectively perform its duties.

LGIM believes the Chair should hold separate meetings with the non-executive directors to discuss the performance of the executives. In addition, the non-executives should have at least one meeting during the year without the Chair present.

Director attendance at board meetings is a vital part of the role to ensure contributions to board decisions and of fulfilling fiduciary duties to investors. We therefore expect companies to allow investors to assess directors’ attendance at board and committee meetings by disclosing attendance records in their annual disclosures. LGIM expects directors to have attended no less than 75% of the board and committee meetings held. Where a director does not attend a board or committee meeting, the company should report to investors the reasons for non-attendance. LGIM would not expect to see a trend in a director’s non-attendance at meetings.

**Board size**

LGIM believes a company should put in place a board of a size that is appropriate for the size of the company and complexity of the business. It is essential that the size of the board does not compromise exchange of thought, challenge, and efficient decision-making and therefore should not be so large as to be unwieldy which can impact this efficiency.

**Board evaluations – internal and external**

The evaluation of directors is a key way of improving board effectiveness and ultimately its performance as well as to improve on what may be an already constructive board for the future. It is also a way for investors to determine from the outside the quality of debate and interaction between board members.

LGIM expects an internal board evaluation to take place annually. This evaluation should be led by the most senior independent director of the board, or if managed externally, by an independent third party. We expect an external evaluation of the board to take place at least every three years. These should be performed by an independent third party to avoid conflict. External reviewers can also bring different perspectives on the functioning of the board as well as experience of how other boards operate.

In the interests of transparency, we expect the process and general outcomes of such evaluations to be disclosed in the company’s annual disclosures, as well as progress on the outcomes of previous board evaluations. Any potential conflict of interest with external reviewers should also be disclosed.

**NED induction**

The Chair is also responsible for ensuring that incoming non-executive directors receive a comprehensive induction to the company on joining the board and that training is available on an on going basis. This will allow new directors to contribute to board meetings as soon as possible. This is especially important if the Chair is considering a board member who does not have previous corporate board experience. LGIM supports the view that companies should hold regular briefings or presentations to the board from divisional directors to ensure that all directors are kept informed of all aspects of the business. The Corporate Secretary can also be an important training resource for non-executive directors.

Directors should be encouraged by the Chair to continually update their skills and knowledge and should agree on their specific training and developmental needs which should include all aspects of social, environmental, ethical and reputational risks faced by the business. One way to remain up to date is to regularly meet with investors, along with other relevant board members, to gain knowledge and to hear various perspectives.
We would also encourage new board members to use their investors as a resource to help them in performing their duties. LGIM regularly organises Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) related seminars for board directors aimed at discussing views on key ESG topics. We also regularly publish worldwide thought leadership pieces on relevant topics related to corporate governance, stewardship and responsible investment that can be accessed through our website.

Stakeholder engagement
LGIM believes companies should be managed to take into account the interests of their stakeholders on material issues. Understanding and taking into account key stakeholders’ views allows boards to create better alignment between the company and its stakeholders’ interests. We expect companies to report in their annual disclosures how engagement with key stakeholders has fed into board discussions.

• Employee voice
We acknowledge that different countries, through regulation or best practice codes, may have different approaches to how boards should consider the views of their employees. LGIM believes investors should be able to hold directors accountable for their consideration of employee views.

Where hard or soft law does not provide any guidance, we encourage companies to set up a structure they find appropriate. They may prefer the appointment of employee representatives on the board or the use of forums or advisory panels. For instance, in the UK, LGIM encourages the nomination of a current independent non-executive director to seek out employees’ views at different levels of the business and to regularly report these back to the board.

• Investor dialogue
LGIM believes that engagement constitutes a vital risk mitigation tool for the board. Engagement with investors should be a two-way discussion. Board directors should aim to use engagement meetings with investors as an opportunity to explain company decisions and to make sure they are well understood by the market. Such meetings should also be an opportunity to listen to investors, use their experience and act on their feedback.

LGIM’s position on Board-investor dialogue, is available on our website.

Culture
Culture has been an increasingly discussed topic in recent years amongst businesses, investors and even regulators, and its measurement and assessment is an exercise we expect the Board to undertake.

For investors to understand company culture, requires disclosure from the board, given its role in setting values. Investors need reassurance that the CEO and management really drive the cultural message and set the tone from the top, and that this is regularly discussed and challenged by the board, as well as monitoring how the cultural message filters down to the rest of the organisation.

We expect companies to disclose in their annual report aspects such as:

• How culture is measured and how it relates to the business strategy
• How the mission statement of the company and its values are communicated and reinforced
• Any KPIs that are linked to culture
• Any relevant data linked to the workforce such as turnover percentage, attrition analysis, and how exit interviews are used

For more details on LGIM’s position, please refer to our publications on the topic available at: http://www.lgim.com/uk/en/capabilities/corporate-governance/influencing-the-debate/

Board committees
Board committees ensure that specific directors are responsible for key board functions.

LGIM expects all listed companies to put in place three separate board committees responsible for the core board functions of audit, nomination and succession, and remuneration.

Companies may also choose to put in place additional board committees where necessary and appropriate, such as a risk committee or governance committee.

In order for investors to assess the effectiveness of board committees, LGIM expects disclosure of the role and composition of all board committees as well as for committees to report on their activities to investors in the annual disclosure documents.

Audit Committee
The audit committee is responsible for monitoring the integrity of the financial statements of the company, appointing external auditors, monitoring their qualifications and independence as well their effectiveness and resource levels. This committee is also responsible for the overall risk management of the company to ensure that sound and robust internal controls are in place to appropriately manage the company’s financial, operational and reputational risks.
As the audit committee plays a vital role in safeguarding investors’ interests, LGIM expects all companies to have an audit committee comprised entirely of independent non-executive directors. In order for the committee to operate effectively it should comprise at least three members, with at least one member with financial expertise.

Non-independent directors may attend audit committee meetings by invitation but should not be members of the committee. The company Chair may be a member of the committee if considered independent on appointment but should not chair the committee.

Members should have sufficient time to examine company financial statements and to liaise with both internal and external auditors. The chair of the audit committee should be available to answer investors’ concerns on specific audit issues.

Nomination and Succession Committee
The nomination and succession committee is responsible for overseeing all board and senior executive appointments, ensuring an orderly and successful board and executive succession process. The committee should ensure the board has the right composition, taking into account important governance considerations such as skillsets, diversity, tenure, and over-boarding.

Focus of the committee should, however, not be restricted to the board but it must also seek to include alignment with the rest of the workforce in terms of human capital policies. The committee should also work closely with the remuneration committee to ensure that appropriate service contracts are in place.

Given the key role of this committee in board composition matters, LGIM expects it to be entirely composed of independent non-executive directors. The committee should be chaired by the company Chair if the individual is considered independent on appointment.

The committee chair should be answerable to investors if it is felt that appropriate succession plans are not in place or where there are concerns over the composition of the board.

Remuneration Committee
The remuneration committee is responsible for the setting and operating of the company’s remuneration strategy for executive directors and senior executives. It should also have awareness of and an overview of remuneration policies within the rest of the company, below executive management level.

The chair of the remuneration committee should have appropriate knowledge of the business to align the remuneration with its strategy. For this reason the person appointed to the role of remuneration committee chair should ideally have served as a member of the board for at least a year prior to appointment as chair of the committee.

LGIM expects the committee to consist exclusively of independent non-executive directors. The company chair can be a member of the committee if considered independent on appointment but should not chair the committee. Non-independent directors may attend remuneration committee meetings by invitation but should not be members of the committee.

The remuneration committee should seek independent advice. It should therefore have the authority to appoint its own independent external remuneration advisors to assist it by providing external data and other information. The use of such advice, including fees, should be reported in public annual disclosures.

Additional Board Committees
Companies may consider it appropriate to set up additional board committees to assist the board in its discussions. These committees are useful where the board could benefit from an increased focus on an issue that is directly linked to its long-term success or where the company operates in a high risk sector.

For example, we commonly see the implementation of Risk, Governance, Sustainability, Health and Safety, Research and Development, or Technology committees.

Advisory Committees
In other cases, boards may consider the need for direct access to independent and external advice and expertise from third parties or stakeholders. We are supportive of companies setting up advisory committees. We consider this a flexible option to obtain specific and relevant information to assist the board and management in their decision-making without having to impact the size and composition of the board.
The board is responsible for determining and disclosing the company’s approach to risk, its risk appetite, setting its culture, and monitoring the outcome and controls in place for effective risk management.

The board is also responsible for presenting the true and fair view of the financial position and future prospects of the company to its investors. Therefore, the established processes and procedures to ensure the independence and robustness of the internal and external audit functions, and the level of oversight from the board is expected to be demonstrated and explained to investors.

Assessing the effectiveness of and the resources available for the internal and audit functions forms part of the board’s responsibilities. We expect the board to report to investors their conclusions of this review along with bespoke narrative as to the assessment and noted areas. These should be reported in the company’s annual disclosures.

**External audit**

An external independent audit provides the verification and assurance as to the financial statements of a company to its investors. The opinion of the auditors is to provide assurance that the financial statements are presented fairly and give a fair view of the financial health of the company. Any concerns raised by the auditors ought to be fully explained by the board, including how the concerns have been addressed.

The external auditors are also responsible for producing the auditors’ report which is a formal opinion and evaluation of the financial statements. **We support and encourage the use of the extended audit report to provide greater insight to investors of the auditor’s assessment of the accounts.**

The board is responsible for appointing the company’s external auditor. The company is expected to clearly disclose the audit firm used, the audit partner who led the audit, the tenure of that firm, and why the board considers the auditor to be independent. **LGIM supports the role of the external auditor to be put to tender on a regular basis, at least every 10 years, with the total tenure of the auditor not exceeding twenty years.**

**The fees for the external audit ought to be disclosed in the annual reporting.** Non-audit related services should not regularly be undertaken by the auditor. Where the external auditor does provide non-audit related services, these should be fully explained and disclosed in the appropriate annual disclosures. **LGIM does not expect excessive non-audit work to be conducted by the company’s external auditors, as this will bring into question the independence of their judgment.** Non-audit related services are not expected to exceed 50% of the value of the audit services in any given year.

LGIM considers that auditor liability is an important and proportional approach to supporting a high quality audit. We are not supportive of a fixed auditor liability or restrictions on that liability.

Recommendations arising from the external audit, are to be overseen by the board and the audit committee, and should be reported to investors where considered material by the board and/or the Audit Partner.
Internal audit
Companies should have an effective and sufficiently resourced internal audit system in place which is designed to take into account new and emerging risks that will affect its business objectives and identify the level of risk taken. The process and procedures in place to manage such risks should be embedded into the risk-based control system for the company, and summarised in the annual reporting to investors. The audit committee should have responsibility and oversight of the internal audit function.

Whistleblowing
LGIM expects companies to establish a whistleblowing policy that is integrated into its Code of Conduct. The policy ought to be publicly disclosed and open to third-party use. The whistleblowing reporting channels should be easily identified and sufficiently independent from management, with a direct line to the Board or audit committee to allow for appropriate oversight and independent escalation where necessary. Companies should ensure their policy safeguards the identity of any whistleblower. Companies should also report how the risks associated with bribery and other illegal behaviour are being monitored and addressed.

Cyber security
The breakdown of a company’s cyber-security can have a material financial impact. Therefore, we expect a risk-based approach to be taken to address the issue of cyber-security and data protection. It should be integrated into the control functions of the business, and overseen from a strategic perspective by the board. It is the board’s role to understand the infrastructure needed in the business to protect valuable information assets and key intellectual property and therefore accountability should not be delegated. The issue should be a regular board agenda item and where there is an incident, we expect this to be disclosed to the market and customers in a timely manner.
Compensation

LGIM is increasingly concerned about the misalignment of both the structure and the quantum of executive pay versus company performance, and the current social sensitivities around income inequality.

As a long-term and engaged investor, we entrust the board to ensure executive directors’ pay is fair, balanced and aligned with the strategy, and long-term growth and performance of the business. In order to be able to hold the board to account where it fails to do so, we expect all companies to allow shareholders an annual vote on executive directors’ pay and non-executive directors’ fees at the annual shareholder meetings.

In addition, in order for investors to be able to appropriately assess directors’ pay, we expect disclosure of the executive remuneration structure, including quantum and a description of the metrics and targets used under incentive plans where applicable and within the limit of what the company is publicly allowed to disclose.

Whilst we are cognisant of the variations in executive pay practices globally, we expect companies to consider our principles below when setting pay policies for their executive board.

Key principles
We apply a set of simple pay principles when looking at remuneration structures:

1. The structure of remuneration and the payments awarded should be fair, balanced and understandable. This means: fair in terms of what the company has achieved; balanced in terms of quantum to the executive, employees and investors; and understandable for the recipient, the board and investors
2. Awards should incentivise long-term thinking by management and be aligned to and support the achievement of the business strategy and objectives
3. Executives should have meaningful direct equity holdings while employed and thereafter; buying shares is one of the best ways of aligning the interests of management and investors
4. Boards should retain ultimate flexibility to apply discretion and ‘sense-check’ the final payments to ensure that it is aligned with the underlying long-term performance of the business
5. Companies should be transparent on why rewards have transferred to the executive, setting out targets that were set, their relevance to meeting long term goals, which targets were met and fully justify all adjustments made to accounting measures for remuneration purposes.

Fixed remuneration
We would expect a base salary for executives to be commensurate with the size and complexity of the company. Although salary levels at peer companies may be considered, these should not set a definite benchmark.

Salary increases should not be automatic each year. Any increase to salary levels should be commensurate with what is offered to the general workforce and its impact on total remuneration should be assessed before approval.

Incentive arrangements
Annual Incentive
Companies may choose to award annual incentives to executive directors. LGIM believes that any annual incentive should be geared to delivering the strategy of the business. A significant portion of the annual incentive should be linked to the delivery of financial performance. In addition, achieving a threshold level of financial performance should be a pre-requisite for payment of any bonus that is based on personal objectives or strategic objectives.

LGIM would expect companies that are exposed to high levels of environmental, social or reputational risk to include relevant targets that focus management in mitigating these risks.

In order to more closely align with investors and company performance, we ask companies to pay a portion of the bonus in shares deferred for at least 2 years. Additionally, the bonus should be set as an appropriate proportion of base salary and should not be uncapped. We also expect companies to put in place contractual and statutory provisions that may allow for a reduction or forfeiture of the annual bonus component in exceptional circumstances.
Long-Term Incentives (LTIP)
LGIM believes that a company should motivate and reward executives by granting long-term equity incentives which will align their interests with those of long-term investors. Incentives should be structured to motivate management to build a sustainable business which will generate positive returns to investors over the longer term. LGIM therefore strongly encourages all companies to put in place a long-term incentive plan.

In the interest of simplicity, LGIM advocates the adoption of one long-term plan. We strongly discourage the adoption of any additional incentive plan which would complicate the remuneration structure e.g. matching schemes or which would reward executive directors for motives which should already be addressed by the LTIP e.g. retention plans or transaction bonus type schemes.

The LTIP should not have too many performance conditions but should include at least one measure that is linked to shareholder returns. Other measures should be linked to the strategy of the business, such as Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) which are selected by the board. We expect at least 50% of awards made to be linked to performance conditions that cover a period of not less than 3 years. LGIM expects companies to increase the level of performance-based pay over time and as such we will expect at least 65% of long-term incentives to be performance-based by 2022.

In addition, all LTIPs should be capped either as a percentage of salary or a fixed number of shares. Where a fixed number of shares is used, LGIM would expect the number of shares being offered to be reviewed every 3 years to ensure they are offering a commensurate level of reward as when first adopted. Any increase to levels of reward should be subject to shareholder approval.

In order for investors to assess the appropriateness of long-term incentive arrangements, we expect companies to disclose the metrics and targets used under the plan, within the limits of what they can disclose. We expect the Remuneration Committee to maintain sufficient authority to exercise discretion when there is not a clear link.

Note that LGIM does not support retrospective changes to performance conditions that have been pre-set. We also expect companies to put in place contractual and statutory provisions that may allow for a reduction or forfeiture of the long-term incentive component in exceptional circumstances.

Holding Periods
LGIM encourages the use of post-vesting holding periods as we find this helps aligning the remuneration structure with long-term performance.

In addition, to encourage the right values and behaviour of directors to drive the business for the long term benefit of investors we would encourage all companies to consider requiring directors to continue to hold at least half of the minimum shareholding requirement for two years post retirement.

Equity dilution
LGIM believes that strict guidelines should be adhered to in relation to the issuance of shares for incentive schemes, in order to limit potential dilution to shareholders. As a general rule, LGIM expects no more than 10% of a company’s equity to be used for all share schemes over a 10 year period and no more than 5% in 10 years for discretionary schemes. The annual run rate or burn rate should also be reasonable, approximately 1%.

These limits may vary in certain regions and any variance will be highlighted in the relevant regional policy. Treasury shares should be included within these limits. Such restrictions should apply to all shares whether they are market purchased or newly issued. LGIM encourages companies to provide transparent explanations regarding the issuance of shares and for share schemes to have performance conditions attached.

Hedging of stock
LGIM believes the hedging of shares by executives in the shares of the companies where they are employed severs the alignment of interests of the executive with shareholders. We believe companies should adopt strict policies to prohibit executives from hedging the economic risk associated with their share ownership in the company.
Pledging of stock
LGIM believes investors benefit when employees, particularly senior executives, have ‘skin in the game’. LGIM therefore recognizes the benefits of measures designed to encourage employees to both buy shares out of their own pocket and to retain shares that they have been granted. Pledging shares can present the risk that an executive with significant pledged shares and limited other assets may have an incentive to avoid a forced sale of shares in the face of rapid stock price decline. To avoid substantial losses from a forced sale to meet the terms of the loan, the executive may have an incentive to boost the stock price in the short term in a way that is unsustainable and so hurts investors in the long term. Concerns regarding pledging may not apply to less senior employees, given the latter group’s limited influence on a company’s stock price. Therefore, the issue of pledging shares should be reviewed in that context, as should policies that distinguish between the two groups.

Service contracts and termination payments
Under the Dodd-Frank Act, companies are required to disclose additional compensation arrangements with executive officers in connection with merger transactions, known as ‘golden parachutes’. All agreements should be disclosed, including those between the acquiring and target companies have with the executive officers of both companies.

LGIM expects companies to provide a separate shareholder advisory vote to approve ‘golden parachute’ arrangements in connection with a merger, acquisition, consolidation, proposed sale or other disposition of all or substantially all assets.

The accelerated vesting of equity due to a change in control does not reward performance and would not be an element LGIM would support. Instead, equity should move to the newly merged companies and should vest over a period of time if performance conditions are met. If the board considers accelerated vesting appropriate, then this should only be triggered if a change of control has occurred and the executive loses their job in the company – known as a ‘double trigger’. Accelerated vesting should not occur simply on a change of control with the executive remaining employed in the new company – known as a ‘single trigger’. Such accelerated vesting of awards made under a change in control situation should be done on a pro-rata basis so that only awards that have met performance conditions are given.

Tax gross-ups
LGIM does not expect companies to provide tax grossups to its executives in severance payments. In agreeing to tax gross-ups on service contracts, the compensation committee may be committing the company to paying excessive amounts in the event of a change in control. LGIM does not support such payments and many companies have phased out such tax gross-ups in new service contracts.

New Joiners
When setting remuneration of a new executive who lacks experience of the company and/or the role, LGIM would encourage the remuneration committee to consider placing the individual on a lower salary than their predecessor, with a view to increasing their pay over an extended time period, subject to performance. Where possible, the existing remuneration arrangements should be used to incentivise new appointees.

New recruits should be encouraged to purchase shares in the company. Additional benefits in relation to the appointment, such as assistance to re-locate, should be time limited.

Executive Directors should retain shares in the company for at least two years post exit, at the higher of two times salary or half the minimum shareholding requirement (valued at exit).

The use of ‘golden hello’ payments is not supported. Where a buy-out of existing awards from a previous employer is necessary, it should only cover the expected loss of value, and be awarded predominately in shares and subject to performance.

Departing directors
LGIM expects the company to ensure that there have been no rewards for failure. Therefore the remuneration committee should take into account poor performance or any exceptional events, i.e. loss of life, when determining whether a director should be paid a bonus for the period worked.

With the exception of dismissal for cause and/or poor performance where awards should be lapsed, any outstanding awards of leavers should be time pro-rated and allowed to run their course subject to the same vesting conditions that applied at grant.

Benchmarking
When using benchmark data, the remuneration committee should take into consideration a number of factors: size of the company, its geographic spread and performance relative to the benchmark peers. The peer group used should not be too large or too small as both extremes could produce misleading results. Companies should ensure they disclose meaningful information on the benchmarking data used and why it has selected the benchmark group. Directors at underperforming companies should not expect to be remunerated as highly as directors of companies with outstanding performance.

Discretion
Companies can build trust with investors if they can demonstrate historic restraint, consistency and alignment with them. Discretion applied on any earned award by executives is one way to demonstrate this alignment. We define discretion as anything that alters the monetary outcome of total remuneration.
LGIM expects the company to state:

- The main reasons that might give rise to the application of discretion
- Whether discretion would be applied upwards as well as downwards
- The elements of pay to which discretion may be applied

Pay ratio
In 2015, the SEC adopted a final rule requiring public companies to disclose the ratio of the compensation of its CEO to the total compensation of the median company employee. The disclosure will begin in the 2018 proxy season. The company will be permitted to select its methodology for identifying its median employee’s compensation every three years. Non-US employees from countries in which data privacy laws or regulations make companies unable to comply with the rule can be excluded.

To identify the median employee, the SEC rule would allow companies to select a methodology based on their own facts and circumstances. A company could use its total employee population or a statistical sampling of that population and/or other reasonable methods. A company could, for example, identify the median of its population or sample using:

- Annual total compensation as determined under existing executive compensation rules; or
- Any consistently applied compensation measure from compensation amounts reported in its payroll or tax records.

LGIM encourages companies to use its total employee population and to identify the median by using annual total compensation as determined under existing executive compensation rules. We encourage this so that the information provided is consistent and therefore comparable between companies.

Disclosing this information will heighten scrutiny on executive compensation practices, with specific focus on how CEO compensation compares to the median employee. Depending on the magnitude of pay ratios, the new disclosures may exacerbate existing concerns among investors about executive compensation.

The pay ratio disclosure will provide shareholders with additional company-specific information that can be used when considering a company’s executive compensation practices, an important area of corporate governance on which shareholders now have advisory votes. This disclosure illustrates to what extent the dangers of disparity in pay levels are recognised. If used effectively, the data can be applied by compensation committees to better moderate pay packages and reduce the trend of pay disparity. The changes in CEO-to-worker pay ratios will be a useful measure of CEO pay levels and will hopefully reduce CEO pay levels and encourage boards to also consider the relationship of CEO pay to that of other company employees. Companies with high pay ratios will have to explain and justify the ratio to their investors, placing more focus on the reasons behind potentially large CEO renumeration.

LGIM will use the pay ratio information on a relative basis across sectors rather than an absolute basis, allowing us to compare the employee compensation structures of companies over time and against their competitors. Such disclosure will provide valuable information about which companies are investing in their human capital, an increasingly important contributor to investor value and strong business culture. However, LGIM will use this information as only one part of the assessment of overall compensation.

Shareholding guidelines
LGIM expects companies to encourage its directors and senior executives to build up and to retain a meaningful interest in the shares of the company they manage. This is an essential part of aligning directors’ interests with those of investors. The level of shareholding should be linked to the size of the company and the level of reward that the director receives.

Pensions
Pensions are a significant cost and risk for a company as well as an element of remuneration that is not linked to performance, therefore the cost of providing a pension should be taken into account when evaluating a remuneration package. LGIM will not support pension enhancement payments at retirement or when a contract is terminated early. Additionally, LGIM will not advocate an individual being compensated for changes in tax. Companies should aim to reduce their pension fund liabilities and costs when recruiting new executives.

Pension provisions should be disclosed in full in the report and accounts and any changes to pension benefits should be fully explained.

LGIM expects companies to set a target to make pension payments to their executive aligned with what is offered to the general workforce.

Non-executive directors’ fees
Non-executive directors’ fees should reflect the level of responsibility and time commitment of the role. The use of share options or other performance related pay is not supported but a proportion of the fixed fees being paid in shares is encouraged.
Shareholder and bondholder rights

The provision of shareholder and bondholder rights is a basic entitlement for investors. LGIM expects companies to acknowledge and respect the rights of investors through adhering to the highest market standards. This includes providing high quality disclosures and equal treatment of shareholders. Below, we have outlined guidance on the topical issues that concern LGIM as an investor:

Voting rights and share class structures
LGIM supports the “one share one vote” philosophy and favours share structures where all shares have equal voting rights and those rights are equal to economic value held.

LGIM does not support the issue of shares with enhanced or impaired voting rights. In some markets, however, differential voting rights is a long standing structure and where this exists the structure should be transparently disclosed. In the case of controlled companies, LGIM will review the issuance of shares with enhanced voting rights to understand why these would be necessary. In general, LGIM encourages companies to eliminate differential voting rights over time.

Acting by written consent and calling special meetings
Shareholders should have the right to call special meetings. This allows a shareholder to put resolutions to all shareholders at a specially convened company meeting. Generally, LGIM believes that companies should allow shareholders with a minimum holding of 10% to call special meetings as this allows sufficient access but prevents abuse of this benefit. However, LGIM will take into account the company shareholding structure when assessing whether the proposed threshold is appropriate. Additionally, there should not be any material restrictions to the ability of shareholders to call this meeting once an acceptable threshold has been set.

If a threshold of 10-25% holding (depending on the company shareholding structure) to call a special meeting is in place and if other governance practices are strong, as well as the company’s open engagement with shareholders, then LGIM will not support the right to act by written consent, as this can disenfranchise some shareholders to the benefit of only a few.

Access to proxy
LGIM considers proxy access to be a standard shareholder right and expects companies to apply a provision to enable shareholders to propose directors to the board. Therefore, LGIM will support proposals that allow access for 20% of the board or a minimum of two seats to be proposed to the proxy if a shareholder group of no more than 20 shareholders owns 3% of outstanding shares for three years.

LGIM believes:
- Restrictions on re-nominations when a nominee fails to receive a specific percentage of votes are inappropriate.
- Re-submission requirements are not required for management’s candidates, and therefore should not apply to candidates proposed by shareholders.
- Securities on loan should be counted towards the ownership threshold, provided the shareholder shows it has the legal right to recall shares for voting purposes and will vote them at the shareholder meeting along with representation that the shareholder will hold those shares through the date of the meeting.
- A requirement that a nominator provide a statement of intent to continue to hold the required percentage of shares after the annual meeting is unnecessary.

Nominating shareholders may not know their intent to hold, sell or buy shares until after the election, so the pre-filing holding period of three years, coupled with the requirement to hold the shares through the shareholder meeting, is adequate.
- A prohibition on a nominator from using proxy access for the two annual meetings following an annual meeting at which its nominee is elected to the board (except for the nominee initially elected) is inappropriate.
- A group of funds counts as a single shareholder for the purposes of meeting the 3% ownership threshold with aggregation limits.
Supermajority vote standard
Supermajority provisions on voting go against the principle that a simple majority of voting shares should be sufficient to effect change at a company. The supermajority provision serves to entrench management by preventing amendments that would be in the best interests of investors. **LGIM expects companies to eliminate such provisions and, where this requires supermajority support to be enacted, that the company make concerted efforts to gain their shareholder support in order to change its bylaws.**

Cumulative voting
Cumulative voting allows shareholders to cumulate their votes for one or more directors on the ballot. Each shareholder is entitled to as many votes as are equal to the number of their shares multiplied by the number of directors to be elected. The shareholder may cast all of such votes for one nominee or may distribute them among two or more nominees at their discretion. **LGIM does not support cumulative voting as it does not protect minority shareholder rights and does not support the democratic election of directors.**

Amendments to the company's constitution
It is common to see requests from companies seeking approval to update/amend the company’s constitution as they impact members’ rights.

LGIM expects these changes to be clearly outlined and disclosed in the notice of meeting. Approval at the general meeting should also be sought as separate resolutions, not bundled. Whilst LGIM assesses bundled resolutions on a case-by-case basis, we initially view them negatively as they could potentially undermine the value of a shareholder vote and it may be a source of confusion.

Company bylaws
LGIM believes that exclusive forum bylaw provisions limiting a shareholder’s choice of legal venue are not in the best interests of shareholders. Such clauses may effectively discourage the use of shareholder derivative claims by increasing their associated costs and making them more difficult to pursue. LGIM does not encourage limitations on shareholders’ legal recourse including limiting themselves to a single jurisdiction without compelling evidence that it will be of benefit, and expects companies to provide a compelling argument on why the provision would directly benefit shareholders.

LGIM also expects companies to put bylaw amendments that have the potential to reduce or negatively impact shareholder rights to a shareholder vote.

Virtual/electronic general meetings
LGIM believes that general meetings are fundamentally important to the exercise of shareholder rights and integral to a good corporate governance system. Furthermore, we view physical shareholder meetings as providing an important mechanism by which a Board is held publically accountable to all their shareholders, both institutional and retail.

Shareholder meetings provide an invaluable opportunity to raise particular concerns with a board in a public forum and investors are able use this mechanism as part of their stewardship activities. For example, it could be utilised as an escalation tool which enable shareholders to make statements and ask questions to the whole board.

On virtual shareholder meetings, investors are cognisant that companies are keen to make sure that their shareholder communications keep pace with developing technology and those conducting shareholder meetings electronically is an area of particular focus. We also agree that using technology, such as webcasting the meeting, to complement the physical shareholder meeting could be beneficial and could increase investor participation.

However, we believe that such technology should be used in parallel with the in-person meeting, and should not lead to companies adopting a virtual-only approach. The shareholder meeting is the only time that the whole board must be publically accountable to all its shareholders. The attendance of the board to such meeting is a demonstration of its commitment to hear and understand the views of shareholders.

Virtual only shareholder meetings removes this accountability due to the remoteness of participants. The public nature of AGMs and full attendance of the board is also important to allow LGIM to bring matters to the board’s attention. Removing this tool impairs our ability to hold boards to account on behalf of our clients. Companies who adopt a ‘virtual-only’ approach may also risk giving the impression that they are attempting to filter questions or participation of shareholders and do not want to be subject to the varied questions of their investors.
Therefore, LGIM is not supportive of the move towards fully virtual-only shareholder meetings. Any amendments to a company’s constitution in relation to electronic meetings should confirm that a physical meeting will continue to be held.

**Transparency**

LGIM encourages companies to allow investors to be able to appropriately identify and assess their performance on material ESG issues.

**We expect companies to adopt an open approach to the public disclosure of information, within the limits of what they can disclose.** We would also encourage disclosures to be made in English to allow access to information by a greater number of investors.

Improved transparency facilitates informed voting, engagement and integration of ESG into investment. It allows investors, who sit outside board discussions, to have access to key ESG data and be able to appropriately assess the ESG performance of companies, taking into account the board’s rationale in instances where the company does not comply with best practice.

**Capital management**

The board has a key responsibility in ensuring a company has sufficient capital, overseeing the capital management of the company, ensuring an efficient capital allocation and, when additional capital is required, it is raised in an appropriate way.

Balancing the long-term investment needs of the company with shorter-term returns to investors is a critical role of the board.

Therefore, **we support the right of shareholders to have a separate vote on the tools and authorities provided to the board to manage its capital structures.** Such rights protect shareholder interests whilst balancing the need for board flexibility. For example, share issuances are not dilutive and capital is being raised in the long-term interests of investors.

**Share issuance**

LGIM supports a company’s entitlement to issue shares to raise capital. However, **such issuances should be limited to what is necessary to maintain business operations and should not expose minority shareholders to excessive dilution of their shares.**

The existence of pre-emption rights is fundamental to protect shareholders from excessive dilution. It gives the right conveyed to shareholders to be offered any new shares, pro-rata to their existing holdings, ahead of these being offered to non-shareholders.

**Share repurchases or buybacks**

Share repurchases or buybacks can be a flexible approach of returning cash to shareholders. We expect the board to be transparent in how the share buyback authority will be used in relation to other uses of capital (such as dividends, internal investment or external by merger & acquisition).

However, the benefits of using this approach is dependent on a number of factors including the price of the shares at which it is bought back, the company’s individual financial circumstances and wider market conditions at the time.

**When utilising this authority, LGIM expects companies to take into account its impact on other issues.** For example, on remuneration, as performance conditions governing incentive schemes may be impacted as a result of a company undertaking a buyback authority. Furthermore, given the reduction in the number of shares in the market, the holdings of large shareholders will also increase giving them more control.

Please note that some regions have an annual limit on the amount of shares that can be bought back in any year which is discussed in the relevant regional policy.

**Debt issuance**

Good transparency and disclosure by the company on the issuance of bonds is important for debt investors. In its reporting, LGIM expects a company to include a:

- Timely release and public availability of prospectuses both before new issue and while bonds remain outstanding
- Commitment to provide public access to on-going financials and disclosures; and
- 5 year financial history of the company.

**Mergers & Acquisitions (M&A)**

LGIM supports proposals that create value for investors over the long term.

In order to make an informed assessment, we expect management to be transparent on the terms of the merger, and its financial and cultural integration implications on the long-term business strategy. We expect all companies to explain how the transaction is expected to yield significant long-term benefits for the company and its stakeholders, including its investors.
LGIM also encourages the company Chair and the non-executive directors to hold separate meetings with investors without management present, and to have honest conversation about the risks and opportunities of the transaction. In a contested takeover, LGIM will aim to meet with both parties before making a final decision.

In addition, LGIM believes that a strong governance framework is essential during any M&A activity. Companies should therefore make sure the independent non-executive directors are informed at an early stage and can obtain independent advice at the cost of the company, with advisors remunerated on a fixed fee basis. A strong process should be in place to ensure there are no conflicts of interest. The skillset of the board must also be reviewed, including past M&A experience, to ensure the board is appropriately equipped to successfully lead the transaction and its impacts on the company. The board may also consider putting in place a separate ad-hoc committee of independent NEDs.

**Takeover defence plans – poison pills**

Poison pill is the term given to an artificial device implemented by a company to deter takeover bids. Well-designed poison pills may strengthen the board’s negotiating position and allow it to obtain more favourable terms from an acquirer.

It is vital that this process is controlled by a fully independent board that is more concerned with investor value than with protecting its own position. **LGIM will not expect a poison pill to entrench management and protect the company from market pressures which is not in investors’ best interests.**


**Related party transactions**

Related party transactions (e.g. between a controlling shareholder and an issuer) are an important issue for minority shareholders as there is a risk that a related party takes advantage of its position. **Adequate safeguards must therefore be put in place to provide protection for the interests of the company and of the shareholders who are not a related party, including minority shareholders.**

All transactions must therefore be authorised by the board of directors. LGIM also expects the company to set up a fully independent audit committee which ensures that such transactions are conducted on the basis of an independent and disinterested valuation.

In addition, LGIM expects companies to disclose sufficient information around such transactions in its annual disclosures to ensure shareholders remain informed of such transactions and are able to make informed voting decisions.

**Shareholder proposals**

LGIM considers all shareholder proposals tabled at a company’s AGM in the wider context of the corporate governance practices at the company, and also in relation to the long-term benefits for investors. LGIM expects companies to provide a meaningful discussion of the proposals to enable shareholders to make an informed judgment.

LGIM expects majority supported shareholder proposals to be adopted. And where there has been significant support (25% or more) then we would expect the company to consider the benefits of the proposal and to discuss this with their shareholders and to disclose in annual disclosures.

**Political donations**

LGIM will not support direct donations to political parties or individual political candidates by companies. LGIM believes that companies should fully disclose all political contributions, direct lobbying activity, and political involvement and indirect lobbying via trade associations. There should be increased transparency around the memberships of and monies paid to trade associations and lobbying groups including:

- A breakdown of payments to political parties, candidates and associations, trade associations, think-tanks, and on direct and indirect lobbying activity on policy and legislative proposals etc.
- Clear explanation of how each of the above associations, contributions and actions etc. benefit the causes the company
- A public statement from the company outlining where it disagrees with the associations of which it is a member on a particular issue, and the reasons why it believes it to be beneficial to remain a member
- Disclosure of where responsibility sits within the company for the oversight of such relationships.
Sustainability

As a major global investor, LGIM has a fundamental interest in ensuring that shareholder and bondholder value is not eroded by a company’s failure to manage the risks associated with its natural and social environment. LGIM believes that if companies take advantage of the need to move towards a more sustainable economy, investors can benefit through protection from future risks and the potential of better long-term financial outcomes.

**Material risks and opportunities:**
Material environmental and social (E&S) risks will vary between sectors and from company to company, depending on a range of factors. However it is important that all companies across different sectors undertake an analysis of E&S issues that could be material to their business over varying timeframes. A dynamic risk mapping exercise should identify the degree to which a company is exposed to each risk element. It should also be used to identify business opportunities such as new products, services, and efficiency gain potentials that the company may face in changing policy, technology and business environments.

**Sustainability as part of business strategy**
Building a sustainable model should be at the core of business strategy, rather than seen as a side element in the form of ethical obligations. Where material risks and opportunities have been identified, there should be a clear link to the overall business framework.

**Policies to mitigate key risks**
Where risks have been identified for the business, robust and comprehensive policy statements should be disclosed to all stakeholders in order to demonstrate the company’s commitment to managing these risks.

**Management systems to mitigate risks**
Managerial systems and procedures should be put in place for all business operations that either can be considered exposed to environmental and social-related risks, and/or that may produce negative externalities. Where possible, such systems should be externally verified.

**Target-setting**
Companies should set targets for mitigating and managing material E&S risks and impacts, as well as for maximising potential positive stakeholder impacts. While it is important for the targets to be achievable, companies may benefit from setting challenging goals in order to maximise overall benefit.

Science Based Targets are decarbonisation targets aligned with the objective of the Paris Agreement. Where material to the business, we encourage the companies we invest in to set Science Based Targets.

**Public disclosure**
Transparency and disclosure are key tools which enable investors to undertake a robust analysis of investment risks and opportunities, and allocate capital accordingly. We expect companies to demonstrate their commitment to the disclosure of sustainability information and data, through publication in key company reporting; this includes the annual report and accounts, with supplementary information in sustainability reports and on websites.

We encourage companies to disclose to key third-party sustainability agencies, and in-line with best-practice international guidelines. In relation to climate change, we expect to see companies moving to report in-line with guidance of the Taskforce on Climate Related Financial Disclosures (TCFD). We also encourage companies to relate the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) to their business strategy and operations, and disclose on this in a clear and consistent manner.

**Governance and accountability**
Responsibility for managing a company’s societal and environmental impact and the related risks to the business sits with all employees. However accountability should sit at the board level. We expect sustainability commitments to form part of the responsibility of the CEO and the board. We expect companies to disclose the governance processes that are in place to oversee and manage these risks. Where material to the business, we encourage companies to link executive remuneration to delivery of these commitments.
Where climate change is identified as a material issue for the business – whether over the short, medium, or long-term, we expect companies to have sufficient expertise and experience on the board to ensure effective strategic and operational oversight.

**Financial impact quantification**
Quantification of sustainability impacts can assist investors to more effectively allocate capital, according to their risk, return and impact objectives. Companies can also achieve a net benefit in managing sustainability impacts effectively.

LGIM encourages companies to demonstrate a commitment to best sustainability practices and where possible, seek to quantify the impact in financial terms in order to internalise the associated costs and benefits.

**Engagement transparency**
Companies may benefit greatly from sharing knowledge and experience with their peers by joining and contributing to industry-wide associations. They might also engage with regulatory bodies to promote best practices.

We expect companies to be transparent in disclosing their public policy engagement activities, whether this be individual engagement, or collaborative engagement as part of an industry association.

In relation to climate change, we would expect companies to publically disclose any concerns they may have with current or evolving legislation and to publically report on any lobbying activity that is undertaken as a result of such concerns.

**How LGIM takes account of sustainability principles within our voting activity and investment processes**
Assessing companies on their management of ESG issues is an important element of risk management, and therefore part of investors’ fiduciary duty. By incorporating ESG factors into investment decisions, we believe investors can gain an element of protection against future risks and the potential for better long-term financial outcomes. This is why we embed both top-down and bottom-up ESG analysis into our investment processes.

In addition, positive and negative externalities generated by companies can have consequences for the economy and society at large. We therefore believe that investors have a responsibility to the market as a whole.

We need and expect companies to play their part. Our sustainability principles set out our minimum expectations of companies with regards to planning, management and disclosure of sustainability issues.

Non-adherence to these principles may influence our ability to assess risk and therefore, our ability to invest through our active portfolios. It may also lead to reduced allocation of capital within certain index funds, as well as divestment across particular investment strategies.

Non-adherence to these principles may influence our voting decisions:

As a global investor, LGIM is committed to addressing the issue of climate change. We believe that recognising the potential risks from climate change and providing solutions to a low-carbon transition is firmly part of our fiduciary duty of managing our clients’ assets. The investment risks surrounding climate change have become so urgent that we are going beyond solely engaging with companies in order to hold them to account on the issue.

Where we deem insufficient action is being taken on the issue of climate change, we have already publically committed to vote against the chair of the Board on a global basis.

**Minimum standards of globally accepted business practices:**
Companies are intrinsically linked to the economies and societies in which they operate. Investors are collective owners of companies and we therefore believe that we have a responsibility to the market as a whole. As one of the world’s largest investment companies, we believe we have a duty to both our clients and wider society to ensure the long-term success of the companies in which we invest. We therefore regularly engage globally with the world’s biggest companies, regulators and other stakeholders.
However, where companies fail to meet minimum standards of globally accepted business practices, as set out in LGIM’s Future World Protection List, LGIM will vote against the election of the Chair of the Board, across our entire equity holdings.


**LGIM’s sustainability commitment**
LGIM makes its own commitment to ensure that environmental and social issues are factored into both companies’ and investors’ decision-making. We set out to do this in a number of ways:

- Market practice, working to create better sustainability standards for the market at large
- Engagement and voting
- Integration of sustainability into active management
- Integration of sustainability into product solutions
- Communication on sustainability issues to the market and our clients
Contact us
For further information on anything you have read here or to provide feedback, please contact us at:

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